The Assembly of a New World Order
By Henry
Kissinger
Aug. 29, 2014 12:04 p.m. ET |
| The concept of order that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis, writes Henry Kissinger. Above, a pro-Russian fighter stands guard at a checkpoint close to Donetsk, Ukraine in July. European Pressphoto Agency |
Libya is in civil war, fundamentalist armies are building a
self-declared caliphate across Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan's young democracy
is on the verge of paralysis. To these troubles are added a resurgence of
tensions with Russia and a relationship with China divided between pledges of
cooperation and public recrimination. The concept of order that has underpinned
the modern era is in crisis.
The search for world order has long been defined almost
exclusively by the concepts of Western societies. In the decades following
World War II, the U.S.—strengthened in its economy and national
confidence—began to take up the torch of international leadership and added a
new dimension. A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and
representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of
liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just
and lasting peace. The traditional European approach to order had viewed
peoples and states as inherently competitive; to constrain the effects of their
clashing ambitions, it relied on a balance of power and a concert of
enlightened statesmen. The prevalent American view considered people inherently
reasonable and inclined toward peaceful compromise and common sense; the spread
of democracy was therefore the overarching goal for international order. Free
markets would uplift individuals, enrich societies and substitute economic
interdependence for traditional international rivalries.
This effort to establish world order has in many ways come
to fruition. A plethora of independent sovereign states govern most of the
world's territory. The spread of democracy and participatory governance has
become a shared aspiration if not a universal reality; global communications
and financial networks operate in real time.
The years from perhaps 1948 to the turn of the century
marked a brief moment in human history when one could speak of an incipient
global world order composed of an amalgam of American idealism and traditional
European concepts of statehood and balance of power. But vast regions of the
world have never shared and only acquiesced in the Western concept of order.
These reservations are now becoming explicit, for example, in the Ukraine
crisis and the South China Sea. The order established and proclaimed by the
West stands at a turning point.
First, the nature of the state itself—the basic formal unit
of international life—has been subjected to a multitude of pressures. Europe
has set out to transcend the state and craft a foreign policy based primarily
on the principles of soft power. But it is doubtful that claims to legitimacy
separated from a concept of strategy can sustain a world order. And Europe has
not yet given itself attributes of statehood, tempting a vacuum of authority
internally and an imbalance of power along its borders. At the same time, parts
of the Middle East have dissolved into sectarian and ethnic components in
conflict with each other; religious militias and the powers backing them
violate borders and sovereignty at will, producing the phenomenon of failed
states not controlling their own territory.
The challenge in Asia is the opposite of Europe's:
Balance-of-power principles prevail unrelated to an agreed concept of
legitimacy, driving some disagreements to the edge of confrontation.
The clash between the international economy and the
political institutions that ostensibly govern it also weakens the sense of
common purpose necessary for world order. The economic system has become
global, while the political structure of the world remains based on the
nation-state. Economic globalization, in its essence, ignores national
frontiers. Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to reconcile
conflicting national aims or ideals of world order.
This dynamic has produced decades of sustained economic
growth punctuated by periodic financial crises of seemingly escalating
intensity: in Latin America in the 1980s; in Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998;
in the U.S. in 2001 and again starting in 2007; in Europe after 2010. The
winners have few reservations about the system. But the losers—such as those
stuck in structural misdesigns, as has been the case with the European Union's
southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions that negate, or at least
obstruct, the functioning of the global economic system.
The international order thus faces a paradox: Its
prosperity is dependent on the success of globalization, but the process
produces a political reaction that often works counter to its aspirations.
A third failing of the current world order, such as it
exists, is the absence of an effective mechanism for the great powers to
consult and possibly cooperate on the most consequential issues. This may seem
an odd criticism in light of the many multilateral forums that exist—more by
far than at any other time in history. Yet the nature and frequency of these
meetings work against the elaboration of long-range strategy. This process
permits little beyond, at best, a discussion of pending tactical issues and, at
worst, a new form of summitry as "social media" event. A contemporary
structure of international rules and norms, if it is to prove relevant, cannot
merely be affirmed by joint declarations; it must be fostered as a matter of
common conviction.
The penalty for failing will be not so much a major war
between states (though in some regions this remains possible) as an evolution
into spheres of influence identified with particular domestic structures and
forms of governance. At its edges, each sphere would be tempted to test its
strength against other entities deemed illegitimate. A struggle between regions
could be even more debilitating than the struggle between nations has been.
The contemporary quest for world order will require a
coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the
various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another. These goals
are not necessarily self-reconciling: The triumph of a radical movement might
bring order to one region while setting the stage for turmoil in and with all
others. The domination of a region by one country militarily, even if it brings
the appearance of order, could produce a crisis for the rest of the world.
A world order of states affirming individual dignity and
participatory governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with
agreed-upon rules, can be our hope and should be our inspiration. But progress
toward it will need to be sustained through a series of intermediary stages.
To play a responsible role in the evolution of a
21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions
for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if
necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral
effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if
supported by an alliance? What should we not engage
in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the nature
of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the application of
these values depend on circumstance?
For the U.S., this will require thinking on two seemingly
contradictory levels. The celebration of universal principles needs to be
paired with recognition of the reality of other regions' histories, cultures
and views of their security. Even as the lessons of challenging decades are
examined, the affirmation of America's exceptional nature must be sustained.
History offers no respite to countries that set aside their sense of identity
in favor of a seemingly less arduous course. But nor does it assure success for
the most elevated convictions in the absence of a comprehensive geopolitical
strategy.
